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This paper introduces an innovative test of search and matching models using the
exogenous variation available in experimental data. We take an oﬀ-the-shelf Pissarides
matching model and calibrate it to data on the control group from a randomized social
experiment. We then simulate a program group from a randomized experiment within
the model. As a measure of the performance of the model, we compare the outcomes of
the program groups from the model and from the randomized experiment. We illustrate
our methodology using the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency Project (SSP), a social experiment
providing a time limited earnings supplement for Income Assistance recipients who
obtain full time employment within a 12 month period. We ﬁnd two features of the
model are consistent with the experimental results: endogenous search intensity and
exogenous job destruction. We ﬁnd mixed evidence in support of the assumption of
ﬁxed hours of labor supply. Finally, we ﬁnd a constant job destruction rate is not
consistent with the experimental data in this context.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J2, I38, J6
Keywords: Calibration, equilibrium search and matching models, policy experiments,
Self-Suﬃciency Project, welfare, social experiments.1 Introduction
Search and matching models are the main tool used in macroeconomics to evaluate new or
existing labor market policies.1 The policy experiments conducted within such models are
the only means available to consider the potential eﬀects of policy reforms that have yet
to be implemented in reality and the general equilibrium eﬀects of small scale reforms that
may be implemented on a large scale in the future. Despite the importance of this policy
evaluation tool, it is diﬃcult to put a high degree of conﬁdence in the quantitative results of
such experiments, as it is often diﬃcult to judge how well the model can accurately capture
the responses of individuals to changes in government policy.2
In general, the performance of calibrated macroeconomic models, such as those in the
search and matching literature, is measured in two ways. The most common measure is the
in-sample ﬁt of the model. In many cases, the ability of the model to match moments not
included in the calibration process is also used as a test of model ﬁt.3 This is an important
starting point to ensure the benchmark model can replicate behavior observed in the data.
However, this test provides no direct evidence on how reliable the model predictions are
under changes to the policy environment. The second gauge of a model’s performance is
out-of-sample tests, where the ﬁt to other time periods is also used as a test of the model.
This is a more demanding measure of performance, as the model’s predictions are compared
to an environment outside of the calibration process. However, because many features of the
aggregate economy vary over time, it is diﬃcult to gauge the extent to which the comparison
between out-of-sample statistics and the model predictions are contaminated by changes in
aggregate conditions.4
1For example, see the evaluation of the Reemployment Bonus by Davidson and Woodbury (1993) that uses
a Pissarides matching model. Many studies have also considered calibrated versions of the closely related
Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching model (den Haan, Ramey, and Watson, 2000; Cole and Rogerson,
1999). See Yashiv (2004) for a recent evaluation of the within-sample ﬁt of the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Others have considered a variety of labor market policies using a modiﬁcation of the McCall (1970) search
framework (Alvarez and Veracierto, 2000). Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) consider policy evaluation in a
calibrated equilibrium model using ﬁrm-level data.
2A very useful discussion of this and related issues can be found in Hansen and Heckman (1996).
3See Kydland and Prescott (1996) for a detailed discussion.
4It is also possible to estimate a structural model on a subset of the data, for example a subset of states,
and use the remainder of the data to conduct a validation exercise. See Keane and Wolpin (2005).
1The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we introduce a new and convincing
test of the quantitative performance of search and matching models. The new test that we
consider exploits the wealth of information that is becoming increasingly available through
social experiments. In social experiments, small subsets of the population are randomly
assigned to program and control groups, the program group is subjected to a potential
policy reform and the diﬀerence in outcomes between the groups provides an estimate of
the mean impact of the policy. Social experiments yield direct estimates of how individuals
within the experiment respond to the incentives introduced by the policy reform. It is in
this sense that social experiments provide an excellent opportunity to determine whether
calibrated models can accurately predict the outcomes of policy changes.
The basic idea behind our approach is the following. First, we calibrate the model
of interest to match the behavior of the control group from a randomized experiment.
Second, we introduce the policy of interest in the model and use the model to simulate a
program group. Third, we compare the outcomes of the model program group with the
outcomes of the experimental program group. The model is asked to match the outcomes
of the program group without relying on the exogenous variation introduced within the
experiment. Further, as in the model, the only change in the economic environment that is
introduced in the experiment is the policy change of interest. Therefore, we are able to apply
a test of the model that is not contaminated by changes in other aggregate conditions that
blur the comparison between the model and the data. In this respect, the social experiment
provides a very rigorous test of the model.5
The second contribution of our paper is to determine whether the model is an appropriate
tool to use in estimating the behavioral response of the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency Project, a
small scale experiment designed to provide incentives for individuals on Income Assistance
(IA), the Canadian welfare program, to leave the system and seek employment.6 We use the
5In parallel work, Todd and Wolpin (2004) use data from the experimental evaluation of Mexico’s PRO-
GRESA program to test a structural, dynamic model of fertility and child schooling using a similar approach.
Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) test a structural auction model using data from a laboratory experiment. Earlier
work by Wise (1985) uses experimental data on housing subsidies to test a model of housing demand.
6A growing literature has begun to look at various aspects of the Self-Suﬃciency Project (Card and
Hyslop, 2004; Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins, 2001; Connolly and Gottschalk, 2003; Ferrall, 2000; Foley,
2004; Kamionka and Lacroix, 2002, Zabel, Schwartz, and Donald, 2004). Similar, but less generous, income
2experimental data on single mothers from the SSP to assess a textbook matching model of
the labor market (Pissarides, 2000, Ch.1). The SSP provides ﬁnancial incentives by oﬀering
temporary earnings supplements to individuals on IA. Individuals must remain on IA twelve
months to become eligible for income supplements; once they do, they receive a supplement if
they become employed and leave Income Assistance within the following twelve months. The
model is augmented to incorporate the main features of the SSP. In particular, the model
allows for time limits in determining eligibility for receipt of the supplement, consistent
with the one-year time limit in the experiment, allows individuals to receive the earnings
supplement for up to three years while employed, and allows the earnings supplement to
depend on the earnings received by eligible recipients. The time limitations for entry to and
exit from the Canadian unemployment insurance program (called Employment Insurance)
and the interactions between IA, the unemployment program, and the labor market are also
incorporated in the model, including the role of minimum wages.
The main margin through which the SSP is designed to aﬀect behavior is through
increased eﬀort by welfare recipients to search for jobs, because of both the time limitations
and the ﬁnancial incentives introduced by the program. Therefore, as in Pissarides (2000,
Ch.5) we also introduce endogenous search intensity in the model.7 Our focus is on testing
the partial equilibrium implications of the model, as the SSP is a small-scale experiment
that is unlikely to have general equilibrium implications for the labor market.
After constructing the model, we calibrate the model in the absence of the program using
publicly available, non-experimental data on single mothers and data on the experimental
control group. The SSP was implemented separately in two provinces, New Brunswick and
British Columbia, and we test the model separately for each province. The parameters
calibrated in the ﬁrst stage include the discount factor, search friction parameters, and
exogenous job separation rates: parameters that are, in theory, invariant to changes in the
supplement programs have been studied in the United States; see Auspos, Miller, and Hunter (2000) on the
Minnesota Family Investment Program and Bos, Huston, Granger, Duncan, Brock, and McLoyd (1999) on
the Wisconsin New Hope program. Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) provide an overview of the experimental
literature and compare these programs to other approaches.
7Our work is also closely related to Shimer (2004), who introduces endogenous search intensity in a
discrete time framework.
3Income Assistance program. We then simulate the SSP experiment within our calibrated
model and compare the model outcomes for the program group to those in the experimental
data.
Our model tests focus on three features of the Pissarides model: search intensity, job
destruction, and the assumption of ﬁxed hours of labor supply. First, we consider how well
the model speciﬁcation for search intensity matches the experimental results. The parame-
ters governing the choice of search intensity cannot be directly identiﬁed in the data and are
therefore the margin that we have the least conﬁdence in. We test the search intensity fea-
tures of the model by comparing the exit rates from IA for the control and program groups
in the model to those in the data. In British Columbia, we ﬁnd that the impacts of the SSP
on the IA-to-work transition rates during the 53 months following random assignment in the
model are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in the experimental data. We are also able
to match the delayed-exit eﬀects of a second randomized experiment in British Columbia
that oﬀered SSP to new Income Assistance recipients. Along these dimensions, our model
test provides strong support for the Pissarides framework. In contrast, the model predicts
a signiﬁcantly (and substantially) higher transition rate from IA to employment with the
introduction of the SSP in New Brunswick. The elasticity of search costs with respect to
search eﬀort in New Brunswick must be much higher than that in British Columbia to
match the experimental impact of the SSP.
The second feature of the Pissarides model we consider is the job destruction rate. The
model test produces two ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that an exogenous job destruction rate
for the program and control groups is not rejected by the data in either province, as there
are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the employment survival rates for the program
and control groups, even when individuals in the program group stop receiving supplement
payments. However, the assumption of a constant job destruction rate is not consistent with
the experimental results, as the employment hazard rate appears to fall with job tenure in
the data.
We also assess the eﬀects of the policy change on earnings. In partial equilibrium, we
4expect no change in earnings, conditional on tenure, due to the small number of individuals
aﬀected by the policy change in the experiment. For British Columbia, this appears con-
sistent with the data as the earnings-tenure proﬁles for the employed in the program group
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for the employed in the control group.8 However,
although the earnings-tenure proﬁles for the employed in the program and control groups
are the same, a closer examination of the data indicates that hours are signiﬁcantly higher
in both provinces for those individuals eligible for the SSP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a prototypical
Pissarides matching model with endogenous search intensity. Section 3 outlines our method-
ology for testing the Pissarides model and presents data on the social experiment used to
test the model. A comparison of the model experiment and social experiment, including
formal model tests, is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we present the model of the labor market that we use to conduct equilib-
rium program evaluations. Three segments of the market are incorporated in the model:
individuals may be employed (E), unemployed and receiving unemployment beneﬁts (U)
or on Income Assistance (A).9 This feature of the model allows us to consider how cur-
rently employed workers, unemployed individuals and Income Assistance recipients interact
in the labor market. The model builds on the matching model of Pissarides (2000), where
individuals maximize expected lifetime income by choosing their labor market state and
the intensity with which they search for work if not employed. The model is extended to
incorporate the Income Assistance program, minimum wages, and time limitations for entry
to and exit from the unemployment insurance program. We focus here on the problem
faced by workers and abstract from the wage determination process and the model equilib-
8We do not consider distributional eﬀects of the policy change on earnings, as the simple Pissarides model
is not well suited to doing so.
9Throughout this paper we use the term unemployed to mean collecting unemployment beneﬁts. In the
model, all jobless individuals are actively seeking employment; they are distinguished by whether they are
receiving unemployment beneﬁts or Income Assistance beneﬁts.
5rium.10 The reason for this abstraction is that we are only able to evaluate the performance
of the model in partial equilibrium: the social experiment we use to test the model aﬀects
only a small number of individuals and as such is not expected to have any eﬀects on the
distribution of wages in the economy.
Key features of typical unemployment insurance and Income Assistance programs are
incorporated in the model as follows. First, individuals face time limitations regarding entry
to and exit from the unemployment system. Individuals who enter employment from Income
Assistance or who have exhausted their unemployment beneﬁts become eligible to receive
unemployment beneﬁts after I months of employment. The number of beneﬁt months
subsequently increases by one month for each additional month of employment, from a
minimum of u months up to a maximum of ¯ u months. Workers who enter employment with
unused beneﬁts retain their unused beneﬁt months and accumulate additional months with
each month worked. Second, individuals who exhaust their unemployment beneﬁts and do
not secure a job are assumed to transit directly to Income Assistance. Finally, it is assumed
that individuals can remain on Income Assistance indeﬁnitely or transit to employment if
they contact a ﬁrm with a vacancy; Income Assistance recipients cannot transit directly
from IA to unemployment. In the following sections, we describe the problems faced by
individuals in each labor force state in the model.
2.1 IA Recipients
IA recipients receive beneﬁts (ba) and pay search costs ca[p(0)z] every month they remain
on IA, where z is the elasticity of search costs with respect to search eﬀort, ca is a parameter
capturing the disutility of search eﬀort, and p(i) is optimal search eﬀort for individuals with
i months of unemployment beneﬁts remaining. The cost of search depends directly on the
intensity with which individuals search within the model. In particular, for values of z > 1,
the marginal cost of search increases as search eﬀort increases. If IA recipients contact a
ﬁrm with a vacancy, they transit to employment. Otherwise, they remain on IA in the next
10The ﬁrm’s problem and the equilibrium conditions are outlined in detail in the Appendix.
6period. The value function for an IA recipient is
V A = max
p(0)
n
ba − ca[p(0)z] + β
h
m(0)V E(1,0) + (1 − m(0))V A
io
,
where m(0) is the match rate for IA recipients, β is the discount factor, V E(1,0) is the
value of the ﬁrst period of employment, and V A is the value of being on Income Assistance.
The only reason IA recipients are not employed is because an employment opportunity is
not available and the only way an IA recipient can increase the likelihood of ﬁnding a job
is through increased search eﬀort. As we will see below the match rate m(0) is determined
in part by search eﬀort p(0).11
2.2 Unemployed Individuals
Unemployed agents receive exogenous unemployment beneﬁts (bu) and pay search costs
cu[p(i)z]. We make the simplifying assumption that unemployment beneﬁts are indepen-
dent of the individual’s pre-separation earnings. With probability m(i), individuals contact
a ﬁrm with a vacancy and transit to employment in the next month. If individuals remain
unemployed in the next month, it is assumed they can continue to collect unemployment
beneﬁts until beneﬁts are exhausted. Following the last month of beneﬁt eligibility, indi-
viduals can either transit to employment, if a job opportunity is available, or transit to IA.







bu − cu[p(i)z] + β
h
m(i)V E(1,i − 1) + (1 − m(i))V U(i − 1)
io
1 < i ≤ ¯ u,
maxp(i)
n
bu − cu[p(i)z] + β
h




The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and unemployment
eligibility status i, where i ∈ {0,1,...,u,..., ¯ u}. The number of months an individual with
no beneﬁts must work to qualify for unemployment is I. For every period an individual
11It is worth noting that we assume all Income Assistance recipients enter employment with tenure zero.
This assumption could be relaxed by assuming workers retain their experience when they enter Income
Assistance and allowing experience to depreciate over time. One implication of this extension would be
that the hazard of leaving IA would decline as the length of the IA spell increased. The drawback of this
extension is that it involves a large increase in the size of the state space.
7works beyond I, i increases by 1. The maximum number of beneﬁt months an individual
can accumulate is denoted ¯ u. If the individual were not working she would therefore be
unemployed with i periods of beneﬁts remaining. With probability δ, jobs are exogenously
destroyed in the subsequent month, in which case workers transit to Income Assistance if
they have not yet qualiﬁed for unemployment beneﬁts (i = 0) and transit to unemployment
otherwise. With probability (1 − δ) workers remain employed in the next month.
It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their unemployment beneﬁts
expire retain their remaining unemployment beneﬁt eligibility. Finally, workers experience
on the job wage growth for a maximum of T months, after which the wage remains constant,
where it is assumed T > ¯ u. The value function for a worker with outside option i and with
job tenure t is:
V E(t,i) =

      
      
w(t,0) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,0) + δV A] if t < I and i = 0,
w(t,0) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,u) + δV U(u)] if t = I and i = 0,
w(t,i) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,i + 1) + δV U(i + 1)] if 0 < i < ¯ u and I ≤ t < T,
w(t, ¯ u) + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1, ¯ u) + δV U(¯ u)] if i = ¯ u and I ≤ t < T,
w(T, ¯ u) + β[(1 − δ)V E(T, ¯ u) + δV U(¯ u)] if t ≥ T,
where w(t,i) is the wage for a person with tenure t who has unemployment eligibility i.
2.4 Search Technology
Assume there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability that a jobless indi-
vidual receives a job oﬀer depends on the probability the worker contacts a ﬁrm and the
probability a ﬁrm has a vacancy. It is assumed that every ﬁrm employs at most one worker.
2.4.1 Workers
The probability a ﬁrm has a vacancy is simply the total number of vacancies divided by the




Applications for jobs arrive according to a Poisson process, where λ is the average number
of applications ﬁled by workers at each ﬁrm. It is further assumed that ﬁrms randomly draw
8workers from the applicant pool if there is more than one applicant.12 The probability a




The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on Income
Assistance can then be expressed as the product of the above components, multiplied by


















U(i) is the number of unemployed workers with i months of unemployment insurance ben-
eﬁts remaining, A is the number of workers on IA, and p(0) and p(i) denote the contact
probabilities for IA recipients and unemployed individuals with i periods of UI receipt
remaining, respectively.13 The contact probabilities are choice variables for the workers
within the model and can be interpreted as search eﬀort. Workers determine the optimal
level of search eﬀort by equating the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in search eﬀort with
its marginal cost.14 The optimal level of search eﬀort, for each labor market state and














V E(1,0) − V A¤
¶ 1
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V E(1,i − 1) − V U(i − 1)
¤¶ 1
z
, 1 < i ≤ ¯ u.
The model presented above is a well known model of the labor market. It contains
features common to many unemployment and welfare programs and is a model that is
12Alternatively, we can consider the length of a period tending to zero and work in continuous time, where
there is zero probability of more than one application arriving simultaneously.
13Note that our matching function, as in Davidson and Woodbury (1993), exhibits increasing returns
to scale, whereas the standard Pissarides model includes a constant returns to scale matching function.
We chose this particular matching function so as to allow agents to take into account the possibility of
displacement when deciding how hard to search.
14In determining the marginal cost and beneﬁt of search eﬀort λ is held constant under the assumption
that each worker believes her impact is small relative to total labor supply.
9straightforward to extend to study many policy reforms. In the next section, we evaluate
the performance of the above aspects of the Pissarides model using experimental data from
the SSP.
3 Testing the Model With Experimental Data
In this section, we describe a way to use social experiments as a test of the predictive
power of the Pissarides model. The social experiment we consider here is the Canadian
Self-Suﬃciency Project. The Self-Suﬃciency Project provides an ideal application for this
paper, as the policy implemented in the experiment is relatively straightforward to introduce
in the model and no additional parameters need to be calibrated. We start by providing
some details on the SSP and then outline our approach for conducting a partial equilibrium
policy evaluation of the Self-Suﬃciency Project.15
The Canadian Self-Suﬃciency (SSP) experiment focused on long-term IA recipients.16
The universe for the experiment was long-term single parent IA recipients ages 19 and
older in selected areas in British Columbia and New Brunswick from November 1992 to
March 1995. This universe was sampled at random.17 Of those selected, 6,028 recipients
volunteered to participate in the experiment and were subsequently placed in program
and control groups by random assignment. Individuals assigned to the program group
were informed that they were to receive an earnings supplement if they found a full-time
(30 hours per week) job within one year and left Income Assistance. The supplement
received by members of the program group depends on their labor market earnings.18 In
particular, the supplement payment equals one-half of the diﬀerence between the earnings
of the recipient and a benchmark earnings level, set at $37,000 in British Columbia and at
$30,000 in New Brunswick for those earning less than the benchmark earnings level. Once
individuals start receiving the supplement they continue to do so for up to three years, as
15For comprehensive details on the Self-Suﬃciency Project, see Michalopoulous, Tattrie, Miller, Robins,
Morris, Gyarmati, Redcross, Foley, and Ford (2002).
16In particular, individuals had to receive IA in the current month and in at least 11 out of 12 of the prior
months to be included in the experiment.
17The selected areas were the lower mainland in British Columbia and the lower third of New Brunswick.
18No other sources of income aﬀected the calculation of the earnings supplement.
10long as they remain employed full time. Individuals in the program group who were not able
to secure full-time employment within the twelve months following random assignment were
not eligible to receive the supplement. Individuals in the control group were not eligible for
the supplement.
The data contain information on 5,685 recipients in the main study: 2,827 control group
members and 2,858 program group members.19 From the full sample, 4,371 single mothers
provided information for the 18, 36, and 54 month follow-up surveys. We eliminate a
further 1,025 observations for those individuals already employed at random assignment.
The remaining sample contains 3,346 respondents, of whom 1,671 are members of the control
group and 1,675 are members of the program group.20 This ﬁnal sample is the one we use
for our policy evaluation.
The process we undertake to evaluate the Self-Suﬃciency Project involves the following
three stages:
1. Calibrate the model to the populations targeted by the SSP social experiment and
to the control group in the social experiment in each province. This represents the
model control groups.
2. Introduce the Self-Suﬃciency Project in the model as an experiment. Simulate the
behavioral eﬀects of the program in partial equilibrium for each province. This rep-
resents our model program groups.
3. Compare the levels and impacts predicted by the model to those observed in the data.
This exercise provides evidence on how well our model and simulated experiment are
able to replicate the impacts generated by the actual experiment. It is important
19Out of the full sample of 6,208 individuals participating in the baseline interview, 2,849 individuals
were assigned to the control group, 2,880 were assigned to the program group, and the remaining 299 were
assigned to a third experimental group, the SSP Plus group. Thus, we are missing information on 464
respondents. A total of 40 respondents did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the experiment, and 3
control group members withdrew. An additional 398 individuals could not be contacted or refused to be
interviewed. Lin, Robins, Card, Harknett, and Lui-Gurr (1998) consider the possible nonresponse biases
that may arise and conclude the biases are likely to be small.
20The control group contains 815 recipients from New Brunswick and 856 from British Columbia, while the
program group consists of samples of 813 and 862 respondents from New Brunswick and British Columbia,
respectively.
11to emphasize that the partial equilibrium version of the model is the appropriate
comparison to the experiment because the experiment only aﬀected a small subset of
the economy and as such is not expected to have equilibrium impacts, as compared
to a change in policy aﬀecting all IA recipients.
Each step will be discussed in detail below.
3.1 Calibration of the Model Control Group
In this section, we calibrate the model presented above to data on single mothers without
completed post secondary education21 and to data on the control group from the experi-
ment. The model is calibrated separately for British Columbia and New Brunswick, the
two provinces in which the SSP experiment was implemented. There are two main reasons
that we chose calibration as opposed to estimation. The ﬁrst is for reasons of comparabil-
ity. Calibration is the standard way to conduct a quantitative analysis in macroeconomics.
Since this literature has a great interest in the general equilibrium implications of policy
interventions, we chose calibration in this case so that we could speak directly to this lit-
erature. Second, some of the key parameters that were calibrated would not have been
identiﬁed non-parametrically given the data available in the SSP context.22 For the most
part, we are using the same information to calibrate the model that we would have used
had we estimated the model. So the parameter values from an estimation exercise would
likely not diﬀer substantially from those reported here.
The parameters for the partial equilibrium version of the model include monthly Income
Assistance and unemployment beneﬁts (ba and bu, respectively), the wage proﬁle, the size
of the labor force (L), the vacancy rate (V/F), the job separation rate (δ), the discount
factor (β), and the search friction parameters (ca, cu, z). The values used for these pa-
rameters are all reported in Table 1. Monthly Income Assistance beneﬁts (ba) for single
mothers are based on the average IA beneﬁts for a single parent with one child during the
21“Without completed post-secondary education” refers to respondents reporting up to some post sec-
ondary education but no post secondary certiﬁcate or higher.
22For example, the search intensity parameter (z) would only be identiﬁed oﬀ the non-linearity of search
costs in preferences in the absence of matched worker-ﬁrm data. The same type of identiﬁcation strategy
would have to be applied in the estimation of the discount factor.
121990s, as reported in the National Council of Welfare Reports (2002). Over this period
the average monthly Income Assistance beneﬁt in British Columbia was $927 and in New
Brunswick was $737. Unemployment insurance beneﬁts (bu) are set at 55 per cent of aver-
age earnings. In both provinces, the earnings sample is limited to single mothers without
completed post-secondary education, as we are attempting to isolate that segment of the
labor market most similar to individuals receiving Income Assistance.23 The earnings data
are based on the usual hourly wage, as reported in the monthly Labour Force Survey (1997-
2000), assuming a 37.5 hour work week.24,25 We use data from the Labour Force Survey,
as opposed to experimental data, as there is not enough wage data (in particular at jobs of
long durations) available in the SSP to estimate the full wage distribution by tenure. We
estimate a regression with the wage as the dependent variable and a cubic in tenure as the
independent variables. We generate predicted values from the regression, for tenures of 1 to
48 months, and multiply the predicted values by 37.5 to obtain a full-time earnings value
for each level of tenure. Full time earnings for those with tenure greater than 48 months
are set equal to full time earnings for workers with tenure equal to 48 months. Earnings,
IA beneﬁts and unemployment beneﬁts are all converted to 1992 dollars using the all-goods
CPI.26 The resulting monthly unemployment beneﬁts level is $952 in British Columbia and
$695 in New Brunswick.
The model is homogeneous of degree zero in L and F; we can therefore normalize the
size of the labor force to 100 without loss of generality. The number of ﬁrms in the economy
will be estimated in the baseline model, and is identiﬁed using the observed vacancy rate in
the economy. The following relation determines V endogenously as a function of F and E:
F = E + V.
In order to estimate F we use the additional relationship between F and V given by the
23Approximately 14% of the control group in the Self-Suﬃciency Project has at least some post-secondary
education: 11.3% of the sample reports having some post-secondary education and 2.2% of the sample
reports having a degree or certiﬁcate from a university.
24The standard full-time weekly hours in Canada is 37.5 hours.
25The Canadian Labour Force Survey is the analogue of the U.S. Current Population Survey.
26All ﬁgures are reported in Canadian dollars, where $1Cdn was approximately equal to $0.63US at the





The vacancy rate of 3.20% is taken from Galarneau et al. (2001) and is based on the average
for the retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing sectors,
both of which have average incomes similar to our sample. Therefore, using the above





The job separation rate in the model (δ) is constant and can be directly estimated by
the average job tenure for single mothers with no completed post-secondary education in
the monthly Labour Force Survey (1990-2000). Job tenure is only reported for individuals
currently employed in the data: we do not have direct information on separations. However,







t=1 t(1 − δ)t−1
E(1)
P∞




Average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (LFS 1990–2000) implies a separation rate
of 0.0214 in British Columbia and of 0.0121 in New Brunswick.27
We use parameter estimates for our search cost function from Christensen, Lentz,
Mortensen, Neumann and Wervatz (2005), whose estimates of the elasticity of search costs
imply z = 1.8457, and we set the monthly discount factor β equal to 0.9835, correspond-
ing to an annual discount factor of 0.82 as in Davidson and Woodbury (1993). We assess
the sensitivity of our results to these parameters in Section 4.4 below, as these parameters
cannot be directly identiﬁed from the Canadian data. The costs of search are allowed to
diﬀer depending on whether individuals are receiving unemployment insurance or Income
Assistance to capture the notion that searching may be less costly while unemployed. For
example, unemployed individuals may have access to better search technologies through
unemployment oﬃces than do IA recipients, which would be consistent with ca > cu.
27This measure of job tenure does not take quits into account. As a result, we may overestimate the job
separation rate as individuals moving between jobs because of quits report holding jobs of shorter durations.
14To identify the search friction parameter ca we use the Income Assistance-to-work tran-
sition rate, m(0), directly observed from the SSP control group. The data on the control
group do not provide information on the transition from unemployment to work necessary
to identify the search friction for this group (cu). Instead we use the search friction implied
by the unemployment-to-work transition rate of the low skilled labor force.28
Next we must specify the length of time a worker is eligible for unemployment beneﬁts.
The length of the unemployment eligibility period depends on the unemployment rate in
each province and on the worker’s previous job tenure. We set the eligibility periods in
the model according to the eligibility rules during the 1990s. This implies that a worker
is entitled to 5 (7) months of beneﬁts after working 4 (3) months, and 10 (12) months of
beneﬁts after working 9 (8) months or more in British Columbia (New Brunswick).29
3.2 Constructing the Model Treatment Group
The following additions are made to the model to incorporate the Self-Suﬃciency Project.30
First, individuals on IA face several time constraints. IA recipients become eligible for SSP
after they have been on Income Assistance a minimum of 12 months. Once eligible for SSP,
individuals have 12 months to ﬁnd employment in order to receive supplement payments.
If an individual secures a job before the eligibility period ends, she can receive the supple-
ment while employed for a maximum of 36 months. Consistent with the SSP treatment
implemented in the experiment, individuals have one eligibility period for the treatment.
Once the eligibility period for the supplement payments expires, individuals return to the
regular IA system. Second, eligible individuals who ﬁnd work receive supplement payments
that are a function of their earnings upon obtaining employment. As in the baseline version
of the model, earnings increase with job tenure. One goal of the SSP is to provide workers
with enough time to experience suﬃcient earnings growth so that employment remains an
attractive alternative once the earnings supplement expires. On-the-job earnings growth,
which results from increases in the surplus created in worker-ﬁrm matches in our model,
28See Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2005) for further details.
29See Lin (1998).
30The model changes required to introduce the SSP are minor. Full details on the augmented model are
presented in the Appendix.
15captures this particular feature of the program. In the following section, we assess the
ability of the calibrated model to match the main features of the experimental data.
4 Comparing the Moments of the Model Experiment with
the Moments of the Social Experiment
We now compare the predicted partial equilibrium eﬀects of SSP to those found in the
SSP experiment. This comparison represents the speciﬁcation test of our model, in the
same spirit as the comparisons of experimental and non-experimental partial equilibrium
estimates in LaLonde (1986) and other, similar papers in the treatment eﬀects literature.
Throughout our empirical work, we treat the model predictions as constants when per-
forming statistical tests comparing the model predictions to the SSP data. This serves to
strengthen the inferences we draw from the test results by making the tests more conserva-
tive. It is important to emphasize that we do not use any information on the SSP program
group in the calibration of our model; we are interested in determining whether the model
can predict the behavior of the program group without exploiting the variation introduced
by the experiment. Later, in Section 4.5, we show that using the extra variation introduced
by the experiment aﬀects the predictive performance of the model in New Brunswick but
not British Columbia, further illustrating the usefulness of our model test.
In order to mimic the experimental design of the SSP we solve the partial equilibrium
model, using a ﬁxed earnings proﬁle, to obtain the conditional re-employment probabilities.
After calibrating and simulating the model, we select those individuals who received Income
Assistance beneﬁts for 12 months. The re-employment probabilities from this simulated
sample represent the simulated control group. We then use the calibrated parameters and
solve for the re-employment probabilities for an individual on IA who is oﬀered the SSP
supplement. Again, this is done in partial equilibrium, implying any change in behavior
will not have an impact on any other individuals, or on the earnings distribution.31 The
re-employment probabilities in this instance represent the program group in our simulation.
31We also assume that the introduction of the SSP is not anticipated by individuals in the simulated
program group.
16Solving the model for the control group entails solving a system of 145 equations and
unknowns. The set of equations in the system includes:
1. steady state stocks and ﬂows for unemployment, employment, and IA (12 equations)
2. the value functions for employment, IA, and unemployment (108 equations)
3. the re-employment probability from IA (1 equation)
4. the re-employment probability from UI (10 equations)
5. the number of applications per ﬁrm (λ) (1 equation)
6. the ﬁrst order conditions for search intensity when on IA (1 equation)
7. the ﬁrst order conditions for search intensity when on UI (10 equations)
8. the number of ﬁrms (F = E + V ) (1 equation)
9. the vacancy rate (V = 0.032 ∗ F) (1 equation)
The set of unknowns includes:
1. the number of individuals unemployed with i months of beneﬁts (10 unknowns)
2. the values of being in each state, V A, V U(i), V E(t,i) (108 unknowns)
3. the re-employment probabilities, m(i) (11 unknowns)
4. the search intensities, p(i) (11 unknowns)
5. the average number of applications ﬁled by workers at each ﬁrm λ (1 unknown)
6. the number employed, E (1 unknown)
7. the number on IA, A (1 unknown)
8. the number of ﬁrms, F (1 unknown)
9. the number of vacancies, V (1 unknown)
Solving the model for the program group entails solving the additional set of 72 equations
1. the value functions for being employed and receiving the SSP top up (36 equations)
2. the value functions for being on IA and treated with the SSP oﬀer (12 equations)
3. the re-employment probabilities when on IA with the SSP oﬀer (12 equations)
4. the ﬁrst order conditions for search eﬀort when on IA with the SSP oﬀer (12 equations),
and 72 unknowns:
1. the value of being employed and receiving the SSP top up (36 unknowns)
2. the value of being on IA and treated with the SSP oﬀer (12 unknowns)
3. the re-employment probabilities (12 unknowns)
4. optimal search eﬀort (12 unknowns).
17The model has no closed form solution. To see how we solve the model, deﬁne a 145×1
vector for the unknowns, x, and a system of non-linear equations, f(x). We solve this
system of equations in two steps. We obtain starting values by solving
x = argminf(x)0f(x)
using a Quasi-Newton method, where the Hessian is updated using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) update. Second, using the above starting values, we solve the
system of non-linear equations using the secant method (Broyden’s approximation to Jaco-
bian).32 The solution to the model directly yields the simulated version of the model.
4.1 Search Intensity
As a test of the importance of endogenous search intensity, we compare the Income As-
sistance survival probabilities, at six month intervals, for the control and program groups
in the social experiment and in the model simulation in Table 2. If search intensity were
ﬁxed, then the transition rate from IA to work should remain unchanged once the SSP is
introduced in the partial equilibrium version of the model (holding the wage distribution,
hours, job destruction and vacancies constant). Endogenous search intensity is the only
channel through which the transition rate can diﬀer in this case; as such, we have a direct
test of the assumption of endogenous versus ﬁxed search intensity. We construct survival
probabilities from the simulated model using the IA to employment transition rates for IA
recipients in the program and control groups. We start by discussing the results for British
Columbia. The basic pattern matches the experimental data very well. Both the model and
the experiment indicate that the SSP top-up reduces the Income Assistance survival rate
substantially. During the 12 months of program eligibility individuals increase their search
eﬀort and as a result transit to employment at a faster rate. Once the 12 month eligibility
period is over, behavior reverts back to what it was in the absence of the program, and
the transition rate to employment, conditional on tenure, returns to exactly what it was in
the absence of the treatment. It is very encouraging that the model correctly predicts not
only the basic pattern, but also matches the proportion of the program group remaining on
32See Judd (1998, Ch.4, p. 114 and Ch.5, pp. 168-171).
18Income Assistance 54 months after random assignment. For each month, we test the hy-
potheses that the model matches the experiment for the control group and for the program
group, and the hypothesis that the simulated impact of the experiment matches the actual
impact. The p-values for the joint hypothesis tests provide support for the model in this
instance as the model is not signiﬁcantly, or substantively, diﬀerent from the experimental
data at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
As an additional test of how well the model predicts behavior we reproduce a second
experiment designed to estimate the delayed exit from Income Assistance that may re-
sult from the 12 month qualiﬁcation period. The delayed-exit experiment was a separate
experiment conducted on a sample of 3,315 single parents in their ﬁrst month of Income
Assistance receipt in the metropolitan area of Vancouver, British Columbia. This sample
was randomly assigned to program and control groups, where the program group was told
that they would become eligible for the SSP program if they remained on Income Assis-
tance for 12 months. The diﬀerence between the fraction remaining on Income Assistance in
the program and control groups 12 months after random assignment is estimated by Ford,
Gyarmati, Foley, Tattrie, and Jimenez (2003) to be 3.9 percentage points with a standard
error of 1.4. We conduct the same experiment in our model in partial equilibrium. The
model predicts a delayed-exit eﬀect of 4.3 percentage points in British Columbia, which is
within one-third of one standard error of the eﬀect estimated by Ford et al. (2003). The
model is thus able to predict the magnitude of the experimental delayed-exit eﬀect quite
well. Comparing the model predictions with the experimental impacts we can see that the
model correctly predicts both the degree of delayed exit associated with the expectation of
receiving the SSP beneﬁt in the future (the entry eﬀect) as well as the increased transition
rate into employment that becoming eligible for the SSP program induces.
We come to a diﬀerent conclusion upon examining the results for New Brunswick. As
expected, the Pissarides model provides a close ﬁt to the control group. However, the
simulated impact of the program on income assistance survival probabilities is signiﬁcantly
higher than that in the data. Our current parameterization of search intensity is not able
to accurately predict the introduction of the SSP in New Brunswick. We provide a more
19detailed explanation for this ﬁnding below.
4.2 Job Destruction
Job destruction in the standard Pissarides model is governed by a constant, exogenous job
destruction rate.33 To evaluate this feature of the model, we compare the employment
survival rates for the program and control groups in the data for those individuals who
are employed 12 months after random assignment. Table 3 presents Kaplan-Meier survival
rates for the program and control groups in the data. The ﬁrst issue we consider is whether
an exogenous job destruction rate is consistent with the experimental data. Two observa-
tions are of interest. First, formal statistical tests indicate that the survival rates are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the program and control group in the data.34 As in the model,
the experimental data do not suggest the SSP has an impact on the job destruction rate
in either province. Further, the data do not suggest that the job destruction rate increases
after workers stop receiving supplement payments. Both features of the data are consistent
with an exogenous job destruction rate in this context.
However, the data in Table 3 on both the program and control groups do not support the
assumption of a constant job destruction rate. For both the program and control groups, the
employment hazard rate is decreasing with the duration of employment in both provinces.
There are several possible explanations behind this pattern. One possibility is that there
is heterogeneity in job destruction rates across jobs; over time, the sample of remaining
matches contains a disproportionate number of jobs with low destruction rates. Another
possibility is that workers and ﬁrms learn about the true match value over time, so that low
quality matches separate at a faster rate. Both explanations are worthy of further study,
but cannot be addressed in the standard Pissarides framework.
4.3 Earnings
One question of interest is whether earnings adjust in response to the introduction of an
earnings supplement. In the partial equilibrium version of the model we consider, it is
33See Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) for a model with endogenous job destruction.
34See the notes at the bottom of Table 3 for full details.
20assumed earnings do not adjust to the policy change in the experiment because the number
of individuals who receive the supplement is small. This assumption appears to be supported
by the data, as there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the earnings of the
program and control groups in the experimental data in British Columbia and a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence only in month 6 for New Brunswick, as illustrated in Table 4.35
Taking a closer look at the data, however, provides a slightly diﬀerent picture. In
British Columbia in particular, hourly wages for the program group are signiﬁcantly lower
than those for the control group 12 months after random assignment, almost $2 per hour
lower in this month. There are few diﬀerences in hourly wages between the program and
control groups in New Brunswick, as individuals in each group enter employment at wages
that are closer to the minimum wage. When diﬀerences do exist, they are less than $0.75
per hour. Program group members work signiﬁcantly more hours than members of the
control groups in both provinces, reﬂecting the hours requirement for collecting supplement
payments. In month 12, program group members in British Columbia work an average of
17 more hours per month, while in New Brunswick they work an extra 10 hours per month.
By the time supplement payments expire, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in wages or
hours across the program and control groups. In addition, the joint tests suggest there are
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in hours for British Columbia and wages in New Brunswick.36
The data therefore provide limited evidence to suggest individuals in the program group
respond to the introduction of the earnings supplement by choosing a combination of lower
wages and higher hours that ends up providing the same earnings, conditional on em-
ployment, as the higher wage/lower hour bundle that is chosen by the control group. The
Pissarides model does not allow for both wages and hours to be determined in the bargaining
process, thus we cannot use this model to explain these features of the data. The evidence
from the experimental data suggests that the intensive margin may be an interesting margin
to consider, especially if reforms of interest depend on hours requirements.
35Those with zero earnings are excluded.
36As noted by Card and Hyslop (2005), Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2001), and Zabel, et al. (2004),
the fact that wages can only be compared for those members of the program and control groups that
work may be problematic. In the spirit of most relatively simple macroeconomic models, we ignore issues
surrounding unobserved heterogeneity in this paper.
214.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We next consider the sensitivity of our results to changes in the two parameters that are
not calibrated to match data on the control group or Canadian labor force statistics: β
and z. Both parameters were taken from the search literature, the former from a US study
(Davidson and Woodbury, 1993) and the latter from estimates obtained using Danish data
(Christensen et al., 2005). It is these two parameters that we therefore have the least
conﬁdence in. Table 5 presents evidence on the extent to which our results are sensitive to
the choice of the discount factor (β) and the elasticity of search costs with respect to search
eﬀort (z). It is worth emphasizing that the search friction parameter ca is re-calibrated in
the baseline model for each combination of β and z. Lower values for β serve to reduce
the incentives of individuals on unemployment and those on IA to search as the value of
employment falls. Lower values of ca are required to match the transitions into employment
from Income Assistance. A similar argument holds for z. If search costs become more
elastic (a higher value for z), then lower search costs are necessary to match the transitions
into employment. The re-calibrated values for ca are presented in the top row of each panel
in Table 5.
The remaining rows in Table 5 contain p-values for the following three hypothesis tests.
First, we test whether the simulated survival rate for the control group in the model is
equal to the survival rate for the control group in the data. Note that the p-values are the
same for each parameterization. We recalibrate search costs when β and z change to match
the control group data, and as a result can achieve the same ﬁt in each case. Second, we
conduct the same set of hypothesis tests for the program group. Finally, we test whether
the simulated impact is equal to the experimental impact. Each test is conducted at 12,
36, and 53 months. We also test the joint hypothesis that the survival rate in every month
up to month 53 is the same in the data and in the model.
In the case of British Columbia, the results indicate that the simulated control group
matches the experimental control group, with the exception of the 12 month mark. Thus,
the in-sample tests are able to rule out some aspects of all the parameterizations considered
22here. However, assessing whether the model ﬁts the data based only on in-sample ﬁt can be
quite misleading. Two examples of this point are readily observed. First, in several cases
the model ﬁts the control group but cannot replicate the impact of the program. The set
of results for the case where z = 1.500 and β = 0.820 for British Columbia is illustrative of
this point. The model is able to match the control group at 36 and 53 months; however, the
model is not able to match the program group nor the experimental impacts in the data.
In the absence of experimental data, we would be ignorant of the failure of the model to
generate accurate predictions in this instance. This result highlights the fact that in-sample
ﬁt would not reject some parameterizations that our test would reject.
Second, in some cases, the simulated control group does not match the data despite the
fact that the model accurately predicts the impact of the SSP, as in the ﬁnal column for
British Columbia. It appears we are missing some features of the data that do not vary
across the program and control groups and thus cancel out when computing the program
impact. In this case, we may reject the model because of its inability to match the control
group when in fact it is able to produce a good estimate of the program impact.
For New Brunswick, the sensitivity analysis indicates that the choice of a high elasticity
of search costs with respect to eﬀort provides a much better ﬁt to the program group, with
no change in ﬁt to the control group. This result suggests that a combination of low search
costs and a high value of z is necessary to ﬁt the data for New Brunswick. It is again clear
that the experimental data provides us with useful information on the performance of the
model under various parameterizations.
4.5 Using the Extra Variation Introduced by the Experiment
Social experiments provide a source of exogenous variation that can be used to identify
parameters of interest. In this paper, we use other sources of data for identiﬁcation and
instead use the exogenous variation introduced by the experiment to test the performance
of our model. This alternative use of the experimental data is a convincing way to conﬁrm
the model’s ability to capture the responses of agents to new policy changes. In this section,
we determine how well the model would ﬁt the data if we were instead to use this additional
23variation in the calibration process. To this end, we conduct a grid search over z to deter-
mine what parameter values best ﬁt the experimental impact in the data.37 A comparison
between the performance of our benchmark model and that of the ‘optimal’ calibration is
presented in Table 6. For British Columbia, we ﬁnd the ‘optimal’ parameter values are very
close to the benchmark values and that we only make a small improvement in model ﬁt by
taking advantage of the experimental variation. In the case of New Brunswick, the opti-
mal parameter values are quite diﬀerent from the benchmark values. The results from the
former province suggest that ignoring the experimental variation in the calibration process
does not aﬀect the predictive performance of the model; the results from the latter suggest
the opposite. The fact that the conclusions across provinces are mixed, despite the fact
that identical experiments were implemented in both provinces, is further evidence of the
usefulness of our model test.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use social experiments as an innovative and rigorous test of a model’s
ability to replicate observed behavior. In particular, we consider the ability of a Pissarides
matching model, ﬁt to an experimental control group, to match the program group as a
formal test of the model. Our results provide strong support for the model in this instance
along some dimensions but not others. First, we use evidence on the impacts of the SSP on
the IA-to-work transition rates during the 53 months following random assignment as a test
of the speciﬁcation for search intensity in the model. We ﬁnd that the model program and
control groups are not signiﬁcantly, nor substantively, diﬀerent from those in the experi-
mental data for British Columbia but are diﬀerent for New Brunswick under our benchmark
calibration. The model is also able to match the delayed-exit eﬀects of a second randomized
experiment that oﬀered SSP to new Income Assistance recipients. Finally, we ﬁnd that the
employment survival rates in the experimental data are consistent with an exogenous, but
37The grid is over z ∈ {1.50,3.50} with an interval size of 0.005. We do not search over both β and z, as
the discount factor is not separately identiﬁed from search costs. For each value of z we consider, the search
costs parameter ca is recalibrated to match the IA survival function for the control group. Our measure of
best ﬁt is the maximum p-value for the joint test (all months) of simulated versus actual impacts for IA
survival probabilities.
24not a constant, job destruction rate. Our analysis also points to several extensions that may
help in explaining other features of the data, including the joint determination of hours and
wages.
It is important to emphasize two points. First, we could not draw this conclusion without
the availability of experimental data. Our analysis highlights a second use of experimental
data that has not been widely exploited in the literature. Second, the experimental data
provide strong support for the Pissarides (2000) framework in this instance along certain
dimensions, most notably the IA to work transition in British Columbia, the main margin
over which the SSP is likely to inﬂuence behavior. Our model test indicates that the model
captures the fundamental dynamics introduced by the SSP supplement. The data also
support the use of the Pissarides model in the case of New Brunswick, but under a much
diﬀerent set of parameter values. Considering the widespread use of this model, the results
provide support for the use of this framework to study policy changes that impact the labor
market. It is very important, however, that future work considers the robustness of this
result by exploiting other sources of variation.
It is also worth emphasizing that our model test involves a direct test of a partial
equilibrium version of the model. The reason for this is simple: the social experiment is
conducted on a small sample of individuals and therefore does not have spillover eﬀects on
the rest of the economy. As such, we do not have a direct test of the equilibrium implications
of the potential policy change. That said, we take the fact that the partial equilibrium
version of the model passes our more rigorous test as very convincing evidence in favor of
using the Pissarides model for British Columbia (but not for New Brunswick), as the model
can replicate many of the outcomes produced by a social experiment without the use of
the variation introduced by the social experiment. This ﬁnding increases our conﬁdence in
equilibrium policy evaluations and the evaluation of potential policies that can be conducted
within the model but were not conducted within the experiment. In a companion paper
(Lise, Seitz, and Smith, 2005) we use the Pissarides model presented here to evaluate the
potential spillover eﬀects that may arise should the SSP be implemented as a policy on a
wide scale for British Columbia. Lise, et al. (2005) ﬁnd that several important feedback
25eﬀects, including displacement and changes in the equilibrium wage distribution, reverse the
cost-beneﬁt conclusions implied by the partial equilibrium experimental evaluation. Taken
together, both papers illustrate that social experiments and models of the labor market and
government assistance programs promise to be a powerful tool for policy evaluation.




Income Assistance beneﬁts, monthly (ba)1 927 737





Minimum (u) 5 7
Maximum (¯ u) 10 12
Average job tenure, months (1/δ)4 46.68 47.28
Average hourly wage4 10.65 7.78
Average wage, tenure > 48 months 11.12 8.22
Wage growth equation w(t) = 7.89 + 0.0891t 6.04 + 0.0418t
−0.000378t2 −0.0000736t2
+6.10e − 7t3 +5.51e − 8t3
Minimum wage (w)5 5.50 5.00
Vacancy rate (V/F)6 3.20 3.20
Exogenous job separation rate (δ)7 0.0214 0.0211
Monthly discount factor (β)8 0.9835 0.9835
Elasticity of search costs w.r.t eﬀort (z)9 1.8457 1.8457
Notes: All values are in 1992 Canadian dollars. 1. National Council of Welfare (2002). 2. Unemployment
beneﬁts are based on 55 per cent of average monthly earnings from Labour Force Survey (1997–2000).
3. Information on EI eligibility rules is from Lin (1998). 4. Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 5. Minimum
wage at the beginning of the the SSP experiment, (Michalopoulos 2002). 6. Galarneau et al. (2001), based
on the average for retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing sectors.
7. Inverse of average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 8. This corresponds to an annual
discount factor of 0.82, the factor used for all ﬁgures and tables in Davidson and Woodbury (1993). 9. From
Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Wervatz (2005).
27Table 2: Income Assistance Survival Probabilities.
British Columbia
Month Simulated Actual Simulated Actual
Control Control Program Program Simulated Actual
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Impact Impact p-value
6 0.904 0.895 0.384 0.809 0.836 0.030 −0.095 −0.058 0.026
12 0.817 0.787 0.033 0.643 0.616 0.110 −0.175 −0.171 0.881
18 0.739 0.714 0.107 0.581 0.543 0.026 −0.158 −0.171 0.572
24 0.668 0.669 0.922 0.525 0.507 0.287 −0.143 −0.162 0.400
30 0.604 0.618 0.390 0.475 0.476 0.956 −0.129 −0.142 0.561
36 0.546 0.569 0.171 0.429 0.436 0.675 −0.117 −0.133 0.501
42 0.493 0.511 0.316 0.388 0.410 0.198 −0.105 −0.101 0.853
48 0.446 0.482 0.033 0.351 0.410 0.062 −0.095 −0.073 0.817
53 0.410 0.428 0.299 0.322 0.343 0.195 −0.088 −0.084 0.883
1–53 0.364 0.333
New Brunswick
Month Simulated Actual Simulated Actual
Control Control Program Program Simulated Actual
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Impact Impact p-value
6 0.876 0.866 0.417 0.650 0.806 0.001 −0.226 −0.060 0.001
12 0.767 0.766 0.942 0.381 0.626 0.001 −0.386 −0.140 0.001
18 0.672 0.639 0.048 0.333 0.510 0.001 −0.338 −0.129 0.001
24 0.588 0.584 0.798 0.292 0.470 0.001 −0.296 −0.114 0.001
30 0.515 0.530 0.399 0.256 0.433 0.001 −0.260 −0.097 0.001
36 0.451 0.451 0.984 0.224 0.361 0.001 −0.227 −0.090 0.001
42 0.395 0.394 0.940 0.196 0.323 0.001 −0.199 −0.071 0.001
48 0.346 0.359 0.455 0.172 0.298 0.001 −0.174 −0.062 0.001
53 0.310 0.294 0.332 0.154 0.248 0.001 −0.156 −0.046 0.001
1–53 0.576 0.001
Note: p-values for single months are based on t-tests that the actual fraction still on IA minus the model
prediction is equal to zero. For the all months test, we use a log-rank test that the actual (pooled) exits
from IA are equal to the predicted (pooled) exits for the model and the data. The statistical tests treat the
model predictions as constants.
28Table 3: Employment Survival Probabilities, Conditional on Being
Employed in Month 12 following Random Assignment.
British Columbia New Brunswick
Month Control Program Control Program
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
18 0.748 0.697 0.121 0.738 0.774 0.244
24 0.497 0.521 0.514 0.560 0.629 0.055
30 0.395 0.446 0.166 0.485 0.527 0.251
36 0.333 0.389 0.118 0.405 0.449 0.216
42 0.281 0.327 0.175 0.366 0.390 0.489
48 0.265 0.288 0.485 0.340 0.346 0.859
53 0.248 0.255 0.838 0.314 0.325 0.748
13–53 0.675 0.499
Note: p-values are for a t-test of equality of fraction still employed between the control and treatment
group in the selected months. The test for months 13–53 is a log-rank test of equality of the survival
functions, conditional on being employed in month 12.
29Table 4: Average Earnings, Wages and Hours.
British Columbia
Average Monthly Earnings Average Hourly Wage Average Monthly Hours
Control Program Control Program Control Program
Month Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
1 763 698 0.240 8.96 9.22 0.731 92 91 0.858
6 965 967 0.976 10.00 8.98 0.048 104 117 0.034
12 970 1,010 0.462 10.37 8.44 0.000 106 123 0.001
18 1,066 1,072 0.922 10.61 8.86 0.000 112 125 0.020
24 1,186 1,124 0.424 10.73 8.83 0.000 119 130 0.033
30 1,184 1,177 0.922 10.44 9.11 0.003 121 130 0.076
36 1,321 1,199 0.111 10.88 9.59 0.003 123 127 0.474
42 1,402 1,386 0.825 11.07 10.25 0.020 131 135 0.481
48 1,431 1,433 0.978 11.23 10.94 0.440 134 135 0.831
53 1,447 1,443 0.963 11.10 11.26 0.688 132 135 0.559
1-53 0.5961 0.0448 0.2660
New Brunswick
Average Monthly Earnings Average Hourly Wage Average Monthly Hours
Control Program Control Program Control Program
Month Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
1 547 491 0.240 5.98 6.07 0.770 94 87 0.171
6 613 732 0.002 6.40 6.33 0.799 100 116 0.001
12 726 759 0.476 6.50 6.29 0.374 111 121 0.027
18 775 798 0.553 6.80 6.19 0.008 113 129 0.000
24 797 845 0.281 7.10 6.47 0.012 113 128 0.000
30 839 862 0.617 6.99 6.62 0.094 117 128 0.017
36 839 853 0.749 7.13 6.72 0.067 113 126 0.002
42 902 929 0.526 7.13 6.95 0.381 123 131 0.063
48 932 971 0.346 7.31 7.23 0.680 125 134 0.021
53 923 990 0.134 7.45 7.60 0.492 122 130 0.061
1-53 0.1507 0.5801 0.0341
Note: p-values are for a t-test of equality of means between the control and treatment group in the
selected months. The joint test for months 1-53 is conducted by regressing the dependent variable on time
and program status dummies. Observations with zero hours or wages are excluded.
30Table 5: Sensitivity to the choice of β and z: IA Survival Proba-
bilities
Parameters SSP Simulations
Annual discount factor (β) 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.87
Elasticity of search costs (z) 1.50 2.00 3.50 1.85 1.85
British Columbia
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.252 0.170 0.112 0.157 0.224
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
36 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
53 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298
All months 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.513 0.007
36 0.001 0.500 0.001 0.299 0.757
53 0.001 0.660 0.018 0.075 0.468
All months 0.001 0.756 0.003 0.131 0.654
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.383 0.484
36 0.023 0.148 0.001 0.815 0.235
53 0.016 0.655 0.017 0.630 0.803
New Brunswick
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.109 0.070 0.031 0.069 0.093
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942
36 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984
53 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332
All months 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.576
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.213 0.001 0.001
36 0.001 0.001 0.251 0.001 0.001
53 0.001 0.001 0.381 0.001 0.001
All months 0.001 0.001 0.988 0.001 0.001
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.371 0.001 0.001
36 0.001 0.001 0.431 0.001 0.001
53 0.001 0.001 0.922 0.001 0.001
Note: See notes for Table 2.
31Table 6: Comparison of Benchmark and Optimal Calibration: IA
Survival Probabilities.
Parameters British Columbia New Brunswick
Benchmark Optimal Benchmark Optimal
Annual discount factor (β) 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Elasticity of search costs (z) 1.85 1.93 1.85 3.36
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.185 0.176 0.079 0.033
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.033 0.033 0.942 0.942
36 0.171 0.171 0.984 0.984
53 0.298 0.298 0.332 0.332
All months 0.364 0.364 0.576 0.576
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.110 0.010 0.001 0.202
36 0.675 0.825 0.001 0.244
53 0.195 0.426 0.001 0.394
All months 0.333 0.994 0.001 0.998
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.881 0.551 0.001 0.359
36 0.501 0.261 0.001 0.424
53 0.883 0.841 0.001 0.929
Note: p-values for single months are based on t-tests that the actual fraction still on IA minus the model
prediction is equal to zero. For the all months test, we use a log-rank test that the actual (pooled) exits
from IA are equal to the predicted (pooled) exits for the model and the data. The optimal parameter values
are those with the maximum p-value for the log-rank test on the program group. The statistical tests treat
the model predictions as constants.
32A The Basic Pissarides Model
A.1 Firms
Production takes place when there is a match between one ﬁrm and one worker; the number of
ﬁrms can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy. There is free entry in
the economy. In every period, each ﬁrm has the option of ﬁlling a vacancy, if one exists, by hiring
a worker or keeping the vacancy open. If matched with a worker, ﬁrms earn proﬁts that depend
on the surplus generated by the match and pay wages, determined in equilibrium, that depend
on the worker’s outside options and the minimum wage. Proﬁts depend on the worker’s tenure to
allow match-speciﬁc capital to increase the productivity of the match over time. Denote the surplus
generated by a worker-ﬁrm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability δ the match separates and
the ﬁrm is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote the proﬁts of a ﬁrm matched with a
worker with outside option i, i ∈ {0,1,...,u,..., ¯ u} and match tenure t as Π(t,i).
The expected discounted present value of proﬁts for matches of job tenure t and workers with
outside option i are
ΠE(t,i) = S(t) − w(t,i) +

        
        
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,0)] if i = 0 and t < I,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,u)] if i = 0 and t = I,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1,i + 1)] if 0 < i < ¯ u and t < T,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(t + 1, ¯ u)] if i = ¯ u and t < T,
β[δΠV + (1 − δ)ΠE(T, ¯ u)] if t ≥ T,
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases proﬁts.
If a ﬁrm has a vacancy, the value of the vacancy is determined by the probability of meeting
an unmatched worker, by the proﬁts the ﬁrm expects to make from the match, and by the costs of
posting a vacancy (ξ)
ΠV = −ξ + β












where q(i) is the probability a ﬁrm matches with a worker with outside option i.
A.1.1 Matching Probabilities
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, the probabilities of meeting potential workers from unemployment and
IA equal the fraction of workers from unemployment and IA who transit to employment, divided by









A.2 Equilibrium Wage Determination
After meeting in the labor market, a ﬁrm and a worker bargain over wages by making alternating
wage oﬀers until both sides ﬁnd the oﬀer acceptable. It is assumed that both parties have equal
bargaining power, but have diﬀerent threat points. The equilibrium of this game is the Nash coop-
erative bargaining solution and results in workers and ﬁrms splitting the surplus of a match evenly.
The surplus of the match from the worker’s perspective is the diﬀerence between employment at
the equilibrium wage and the worker’s outside option, which depends on their current labor market
33state and program eligibility. The surplus from the perspective of the ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between
the proﬁts the ﬁrm receives at the equilibrium wage and the value of leaving the vacancy open. It
is further assumed that the bargaining process is constrained such that the wage can not fall below
the minimum wage w. The equilibrium wage is max{w(t,i),w}, where w(t,i) solves
V E(t,i) − V i = ΠE(t,i) − ΠV ,
where V i ∈ {V A,V U(i)} is the value of the outside option i. In the following section, we deﬁne the
steady state conditions for employment, unemployment, and IA.
A.3 Steady State Conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of vacancies.
By deﬁnition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total number of occupied
jobs and the total number of vacancies
F = E + V.
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market by L. The total number of individuals
can be decomposed into three groups. First the employed, who are distinguished both by their






E(t,i) + ¯ E,
where ¯ E is the group of workers no longer experiencing on-the-job wage growth. The second group,






where U(i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of beneﬁts remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market can therefore be expressed as the sum of
the above components
L = E + A + U.
Using the above deﬁnitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state, where the
ﬂows in and out of every employment state must be equal over time. The steady state conditions
for each state and eligibility combination are discussed in turn below.
Employment
As above, m(0) and m(i) denote the probabilities that IA recipients and unemployment recipients
with i periods of beneﬁts remaining, respectively, match with a ﬁrm. The ﬂow into the ﬁrst period
of employment includes those workers from IA and unemployment who receive job oﬀers. They
are indexed by their respective outside options as this will determine their progression of beneﬁt
entitlements.38 In subsequent periods, the inﬂow consists of workers who were employed in the
previous period and who were not exogenously separated from their jobs
E(1,0) = m(0)A + m(1)U(1)
E(1,i) = m(i + 1)U(i + 1), 0 < i < u
E(t,0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,0), 1 < t < I and i = 0
E(t,i) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,i − 1), 1 < t < T and 0 < i ≤ ¯ u
E(t, ¯ u) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, ¯ u), 1 < t < T and i > ¯ u
δ ¯ E = (1 − δ)E(T, ¯ u), t ≥ T.
38We assume for simplicity that individuals entering employment from unemployment with remaining
beneﬁt months available start accumulating beneﬁt months immediately.
34Income Assistance
The ﬂow into Income Assistance includes those employed workers who were exogenously separated
from their jobs and ineligible for unemployment beneﬁts and unemployed workers no longer eligible
for unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬂow out of IA includes IA recipients who ﬁnd employment. The




E(t,0) + (1 − m(1))U(1) = m(0)A.
Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the maximum months of
unemployment beneﬁts ﬂow into the ﬁrst period of unemployment, U(¯ u). For U(i) where 0 < i < ¯ u,
the inﬂow consists of unemployed workers from the previous period who did not ﬁnd jobs, and
workers separated from their jobs who qualify for less than the maximum number of beneﬁt months.
All workers ﬂow out of the unemployment state when beneﬁts run out due to the time limitations








E(t,i − 1) + (1 − m(i + 1))U(i + 1) = U(i) if 0 < i < ¯ u.
B Model with Self-Suﬃciency Project
The welfare program and the earnings supplement are modeled as follows. First, in addition to
individuals on unemployment insurance, individuals on welfare also face several time constraints.
Second, individuals receive supplement payments that are a function of the wage upon obtaining
employment.
Within the model, agents maximize expected lifetime income by choosing their labor market
state and the intensity with which they search for work if not employed. It is assumed that agents
have no information regarding the existence and structure of the SSP until month 12 of their IA
spell. Workers bargain with ﬁrms over wages that depend on the tenure of the match and on the
outside options of both parties. Through this channel, the model generates predictions regarding
how starting wages vary depending on whether an individual is entering employment through EI or
IA and on whether or not the individual is eligible for the supplement. One goal of the SSP to provide
workers with enough time to experience suﬃcient wage growth to so they have an incentive to stay
employed once the earnings supplement expires. On-the-job wage growth, through an increase in
the surplus created in worker-ﬁrm matches, captures this particular feature of the program and is
also incorporated in the model.
It is useful to expand the notation used in the base model in the following way. Let i index the
jobless state an individual in currently in: i ∈ {¯ u,...,u,....,1,0,−1,...,−Tin,...,−Tout}. Here
positive i indicates the individual is jobless with i unemployment beneﬁt months remaining. We use
0 ≥ i ≥ −Tout to index the welfare recipients, where the key indices are i = 0 in the ﬁrst month on
welfare, i = −Tin in the ﬁrst month of SSP eligibility, and i = −Tout in the post eligibility period.
B.1 Workers
The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and program eligibility status
i, where i ∈ {¯ u,...,u....,1,0,−1,...,−Tin,...,−Tout}. The number of months an individual with
no beneﬁts must work to qualify for unemployment is I. For every period an individual works after
qualifying for beneﬁts, i increases by 1. The maximum number of beneﬁt months an individual can
accumulate is denoted ¯ u. If the individual were not working she would therefore be unemployed
35with i periods of unemployment beneﬁts remaining, i ∈ {0,...¯ u}. With probability δ, jobs are
exogenously destroyed in the subsequent month, in which case workers transit to welfare if they
have not yet qualiﬁed for unemployment beneﬁts, i = 0, and transit to unemployment otherwise.
With probability (1 − δ), workers remain employed in the next month.
It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their unemployment beneﬁts expire
retain their remaining unemployment beneﬁt eligibility. Finally, workers experience on the job wage
growth for a maximum of T months, after which the wage remains constant, where it is assumed
T > ¯ u. The value function for a worker needs to account for job tenure t, outside option i, and
earnings supplement receipt s ∈ {0,1} where s = 0 indicates the worker is not eligible to receive the
supplement.
B.1.1 Workers that receive supplement payments
Employed workers who receive the supplement obtain labor market earnings and the supplement
payment in the current month. The supplement received by the worker is a function of her wage. In
particular, the worker receives one-half of the distance between her wage and an exogenous ceiling
denoted ˜ w; in other words she receives the average of her market wage and the wage ceiling.39
Individuals remain eligible for the supplement for Tend months once they leave Income Assistance
and become employed. Therefore, workers continue to receive the supplement as long as the duration
of the current employment spell is shorter than the allowed duration of the supplement payment
period. With probability δ workers are exogenously separated from their jobs at which point they
can transit to unemployment if eligible for EI or back to the ﬁrst period of SSP eligibility (i = −Tin)
if they do not yet qualify for unemployment beneﬁts (t < I).40 Employed persons no longer receiving
the supplement (t > T E
end) remain employed, or if they are exogenously separated from their job,
transit to EI.41 The value of being employed and in the states described above can be expressed as
V E(t,i,1) =

        
        
1
2[w(t,−Tin,1) + ˜ w] + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,−Tin,1) + δV A(−Tin)] if t < I,
1
2[w(t,−Tin,1) + ˜ w] + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,u,1) + δV U(u)] if t = I,
1
2[w(t,i,1) + ˜ w] + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1,i + 1,1) + δV U(i + 1)] if u < i < ¯ u
1
2[w(t, ¯ u,1) + ˜ w] + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1, ¯ u,1) + δV U(¯ u)] if i = ¯ u
1
2[w(t, ¯ u,1) + ˜ w] + β[(1 − δ)V E(t + 1, ¯ u,0) + δV U(¯ u)] if t = Tend,
where Tin is the number of months on welfare required to qualify for the SSP supplement and Tend
is the number of months an individual can receive the supplement once employed.
B.2 Welfare Recipients that are eligible to receive the supplement
Welfare recipients receive welfare beneﬁts (ba) and pay convex (z > 1) search costs ca[p(i)z] in the
current month. The cost of search is modelled in a manner consistent with Davidson and Woodbury
(1993), where z is the elasticity of search costs with respect to search eﬀort, ca is a parameter
capturing the disutility of search eﬀort and p(i) is search eﬀort in period i. The cost of search
depends directly on the intensity with which workers search within the model. Let m(i) denote the
39If the individual’s earnings are above the ceiling, they do not receive a supplement. For simplicity, we
abstract from this case within the model as few individuals had earnings above the supplement ceiling in
the data. In the model no individuals have earnings above the supplement ceiling.
40In the actual SSP experiment, once individuals qualiﬁed for the earnings supplement they could transit
between employment and IA and collect the supplement payments in any month they were employed full time
during the 36 months after qualifying. We abstract from this in the model as it would add an unmanageable
number of states. Instead we allow those who lose their job prior to qualifying for unemployment beneﬁts
to transit back to the ﬁrst period of SSP eligibility.
41It is assumed that I < Tend, which is consistent with the actual EI and IA programs.
36probability a welfare recipient ﬁnds a job and transits to employment in the next month. With
probability (1 − m(i)) the welfare recipient remains on welfare. Welfare recipients eligible for the
supplement receive welfare beneﬁts in the current month. Using the same index i as we used for
number of months of unemployment beneﬁts we deﬁne the ﬁrst month on Income Assistance as i = 0,
and continue to count down. Individuals are eligible for the earning supplement in month i = −Tin,
and become ineligible in month i = −Tout. They remain eligible for the supplement as long as the
duration of their welfare spell is less than the supplement eligibility period (−Tin ≥ i > −Tout).
For the duration of the time that they are eligible for the supplement, they receive a job oﬀer with
probability m(i) and if an oﬀer is received, they have the option of transiting to employment in the
next month or remaining on IA. If they do not receive a job oﬀer, they remain on welfare and, if
the eligibility period has not expired, remain eligible to receive the supplement should they secure
employment in the following month. If eligibility for the supplement expires in the next month and
workers do not receive a job oﬀer, they remain on welfare but are not eligible for the supplement
should they receive a job oﬀer. Once eligibility expires, individuals will not be eligible for the earnings
supplement for the remainder of their duration on IA. The value function for welfare recipients in












E(1,i − 1,1) + (1 − m(i))V
A(i − 1)
io







E(1,0,0) + (1 − m(i))V
A(−Tout)
io
, i = −Tout
B.3 Firms
In every period, the ﬁrm has the option of ﬁlling a vacancy, if one exists, by hiring a worker or
keeping the vacancy open. If matched with a worker, ﬁrms earn proﬁts that depend on the surplus
generated by the match and pay wages, determined in equilibrium, that depend on the worker’s
outside options, the minimum wage, and the worker’s SSP supplement status. Proﬁts depend on
the worker’s tenure to allow match-speciﬁc capital to increase the productivity of the match over
time. Denote the surplus generated by a worker-ﬁrm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability δ the
match separates and the ﬁrm is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote the proﬁts of a
ﬁrm matched with a worker with outside option i, i ∈ {¯ u,...,u....,1,0,−1,...,−Tin,...,−Tout},
match tenure t, and SSP supplement eligibility s by Π(t,i,s).
The expected future proﬁts for matches of job tenure t with workers with outside option i and




                      
                      
S(t) − w(t,0,0) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,0,0)] if 0 ≥ i > −Tin,t < I, and s = 0,
S(t) − w(t,0,0) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,u,0)] if i = 0,t = I, and s = 0
S(t) − w(t,i,0) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,i + 1,0)] if 0 < i < ¯ u,t < T, and s = 0,
S(t) − w(t, ¯ u,0) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1, ¯ u,0)] if i = ¯ u,t < T, and s = 0
S(t) − w(t,i,1) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,−Tin,1)] if − Tin ≥ i,t < I, and s = 1,
S(t) − w(t,−Tin,1) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,u,1)] if − Tin = i,t = I, and s = 1
S(t) − w(t,i,1) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1,i + 1,1)] if u < i < ¯ u,t < T, and s = 1,
S(t) − w(t, ¯ u,1) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1, ¯ u,1)] if i = ¯ u,t < Tend, and s = 1
S(t) − w(Tend, ¯ u,1) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(t + 1, ¯ u,0)] if i = ¯ u,t = Tend, and s = 1
S(t) − w(t,i,0) + β[δΠ
V + (1 − δ)Π
E(T, ¯ u,0)] if t ≥ T,
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases proﬁts.
If a ﬁrm has a vacancy, the value of a vacancy is determined by the probability of meeting an
unmatched worker, by the proﬁts the ﬁrm expects to make from the match, and by the costs of
posting a vacancy (ξ)













37where s = 1 if −Tin ≥ i > −Tout and s = 0 otherwise.
Firms will post vacancies unless the expected proﬁt from doing so is negative. Thus in the
steady state equilibrium the number of ﬁrms in the economy will be determined by the condition
that the expected proﬁts from posting a vacancy are zero.42 Note that this also requires a free entry
assumption.
B.4 Search Technology
Assume there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability that a jobless individual
receives a job oﬀer depends on the probability the worker contacts a ﬁrm and the probability a ﬁrm
has a vacancy.
B.4.1 Workers





If a ﬁrm has a vacancy, it will hire a worker and pay a wage which is the outcome of Nash bargaining
between the worker and the ﬁrm, discussed in detail below. Applications for jobs arrive according
to a Poisson process, where λ is the average number of applications ﬁled by workers at each ﬁrm. It
is further assumed that ﬁrms randomly draw workers from the applicant pool if there is more than




The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on income assis-





















Recall, p(i) are the contact probabilities of an individual in jobless state i. The contact probabilities
are choice variables for the workers within the model and can be interpreted as search eﬀort. Workers
determine the optimal level of search eﬀort by equating the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in
search eﬀort with its marginal cost.44 The optimal level of search eﬀort, for each labor market state
42Production takes place when there is a match between one ﬁrm and one worker; the number of ﬁrms
can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy.
43Alternatively, we can consider the length of a period tending to zero and work in continuous time, where
there is zero probability of more than one application arriving simultaneously.
44In determining the marginal cost and beneﬁt of search eﬀort λ is held constant under the assumption
that each worker believes her impact is small relative to total labor supply.
38and program eligibility combination, is described by:
p(i) =

            
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V E(1,i − 1,0) − V A(−Tout)
¤´ 1
z
, i = −Tout
B.4.2 Firms
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, the probabilities of meeting potential workers from unemployment and
welfare are the fraction of workers from unemployment and welfare that transit to employment,




, ¯ u ≥ i > 0, and q(i) =
m(i)A(i)
V
, 0 ≥ i ≥ −Tout
respectively.
B.5 Equilibrium Wage Determination
After meeting in the labor market, a ﬁrm and a worker bargain over wages by making alternating
wage oﬀers until both sides ﬁnd the oﬀer acceptable. It is assumed that both parties have equal
bargaining power, but may have diﬀerent threat points. The equilibrium of this game is the Nash
cooperative bargaining solution and results in workers and ﬁrms splitting the surplus of a match
evenly. The surplus of the match from the worker’s perspective is the diﬀerence between employment
at the equilibrium wage and the worker’s outside option, which depends on their current labor
market state and program eligibility, as well as on SSP supplement eligibility. The surplus from
the perspective of the ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between the proﬁts the ﬁrm receives at the equilibrium
wage and the value of leaving the vacancy open. It is further assumed that the bargaining process
is constrained such that the wage can not fall below the minimum wage w. The equilibrium wage is
max{w(t,i,s),w}, where w(t,i,s) solves
V E(t,i,s) − V j(i) = ΠE(t,i,s) − ΠV .
where V j(i) ∈ {V A(i),V U(i)} is the value of the outside option i. In the following section, we deﬁne
the steady state conditions that govern the evolution of the economy.
B.6 Steady State Conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of vacancies.
By deﬁnition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total number of occupied
jobs and the total number of vacancies
F = E + V.
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market by L. The total number of individuals
can be decomposed into three groups. First the employed, who are distinguished by their current








E(t,i,s) + ¯ E,
39where ¯ E is the group of workers no longer experiencing on the job wage growth. The second group





The ﬁnal group are unemployed individuals (U), who can remain unemployed for up to a maximum





where U(i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of beneﬁts remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market can therefore be expressed as the sum of
the above components
L = E + A + U.
Using the above deﬁnitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state, where the
ﬂows in and out of every labor force state must be equal over time. The steady state conditions for
each state and eligibility combination are discussed in turn below.
B.6.1 Employment
As above, let m(i) denote the probabilities that jobless individuals from jobless state i match with
a ﬁrm with a vacancy. The ﬂow into the ﬁrst period of employment includes those workers from
welfare and unemployment who receive job oﬀers. They are indexed by their respective outside
options and their SSP eligibility as this will determine their progression of beneﬁt entitlements. In
subsequent periods, the inﬂow consists of workers who were employed in the previous period and
who were not exogenously separated from their jobs
E(1,i,0) = m(i)U(i), u ≥ i > 0
E(1,i,0) = m(i)A(i), 0 ≥ i > −Tin
E(1,i,1) = m(i)A(i), −Tin ≥ i > −Tout
E(1,i,0) = m(i)A(i), i = −Tout
E(t,i,0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,i − 1,0), 1 < t < T,i > 0 and s = 0
E(t,i,1) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,i − 1,1), 1 < t < Tend, and s = 1
E(t,i,0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1,i − 1,1), t = Tend, and s = 1
δ ¯ E = (1 − δ)E(T, ¯ u).
B.6.2 Welfare
The ﬂow into the ﬁrst period of Income Assistance includes those employed workers who were
exogenously separated from their jobs and ineligible for unemployment beneﬁts and unemployed
workers no longer eligible for unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬂow into ﬁrst period of SSP eligibility
includes those on welfare who have been on welfare long enough to qualify, plus those who were
exogenously separated from jobs in which they were receiving the SSP supplement but not yet
eligible for unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬂows into all other periods of income assistance consist
of those workers in the previous period of income assistance who did not match with an employer.
Finally, those individuals who did not ﬁnd employment before SSP eligibility expired transit to








E(t,−Tin,1) + (1 − m(−Tin + 1))A(−Tin + 1) = A(−Tin)
(1 − m(i + 1))A(i + 1) = A(i), 0 > i > −Tout, and i 6= −Tin
(1 − m(−Tout + 1))A(−Tout + 1) = m(−Tout)A(−Tout).
B.6.3 Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the maximum months of
unemployment beneﬁts ﬂow into the ﬁrst period of unemployment, U(¯ u). For U(i) where 0 < i < ¯ u,
the inﬂow consists of unemployed workers from the previous period who did not ﬁnd jobs, and
workers separated from their jobs who qualify for less than the maximum number of beneﬁt months.
All workers ﬂow out of the unemployment state when beneﬁts run out due to the time limitations















E(t,i,1) + (1 − m(i + 1))U(i + 1) = U(i) if 0 < 1 < ¯ u.
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